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ABSTRACT
Objective To determine whether a general societal
preference for prioritising treatment of rare diseases over
common ones exists and could provide a justification for
acceptinghighercosteffectivenessthresholdsfororphan
drugs.
Design Cross sectional survey using a web based
questionnaire.
Setting Norway.
Participants Random sample of 1547 Norwegians aged
40-67.
Main outcome measure Choice between funding
treatment for a rare disease versus a common disease
and how funds should be allocated if it were not possible
to treat all patients, for each of two scenarios: identical
treatment costs per patient and higher costs for the rare
disease. Respondents rated five statements concerning
attitudes to equity on a five point Likert scale
(5=completely agree).
Results For the equal cost scenario, 11.2% (9.6% to
12.8%)ofrespondentsfavouredtreatingtheraredisease,
24.9% (21.7% to 26.0%) the common disease, and
64.9% (62.6% to 67.3%) were indifferent. When the rare
disease was four times more costly to treat, the results
were, respectively, 7.4% (6.1% to 8.7%), 45.3% (42.8%
to 47.8%), and 47.3% (44.8% to 49.8%). Rankings for
attitude on a Likert scale indicated strong support for the
statements“rarediseasepatientsshouldhavetherightto
treatment even if more expensive” (mean score 4.5, SD
0.86) and “resources should be used to provide the
greatest possible health benefits” (3.9, 1.23).
Conclusions Despite strong general support for
statements expressing a desire for equal treatment rights
for patients with rare diseases, there was little evidence
that a societal preference for rarity exists if treatment of
patients with rare diseases is at the expense of treatment
of those with common diseases.
INTRODUCTION
Theexpandinglistoforphandrugs(medicationstarget-
ing rare diseases) creates a paradoxical situation for
health authorities. The emergence of orphan drugs
reflects the success of the 1983 US Orphan Drug Act
andsimilarlegislationinothercountriesindealingwith
the lack of market incentives to research and develop
treatments for diseases with low prevalence (orphan
diseases), defined variously across jurisdictions as
0.18-7.5 per 10000 population.
1 In tackling the costs
of drug development and profitability for small target
populations, however, legislation on orphan drugs has
also increased the monopoly power of producers. As a
result orphan drugs are often expensive and rarely
meet cost effectiveness criteria for public reimburse-
ment, creating pressure on health officials to exempt
orphan drugs from standard cost effectiveness thresh-
olds. The problem is likely to escalate as new treat-
ments are developed for existing orphan diseases and
as advances in genetics make it possible to subdivide
common diseases, particularly cancers, into distinct
categories that can be classified as orphan diseases
under existing regulations, each with a tailored orphan
treatment(“personalisedmedicine”).Althoughitistrue
that not all orphan drugs are expensive, those that are
inexpensivearelikelytomeetcosteffectivenessthresh-
olds,makingtheneed for specialfundingstatusa moot
pointinthosecases.ABelgianstudy
2indicatesthatfew
currently authorised orphan drugs meet a €34000
(£27900; $43000) per QALY (quality adjusted life
year) cost effectiveness threshold and that the budget
impact of orphan drugs is substantial and rising.
Debate about awarding special funding status to
orphan drugs—that is, exempting them from standard
costeffectivenessthresholds—hasfocusedonbothethi-
cal and practical considerations. Proponents of special
status often rely on the ethical concept that the serious-
ness of orphandiseases coupled with limited treatment
options requires a “rule of rescue” approach.
34 They
also point to constraints in determining societal valua-
tion of orphan treatments given practical difficulties in
obtaining accurate cost effectiveness information
among small patient populations,
35and to the fact that
low prevalence of disease is likelyto mean low budget-
ary impact.
3 Some researchers,
167 however, provide
compelling arguments for rejecting special status.
They argue that standard ethical justifications for
awarding special funding status to orphan drugs are
not based on “rarity” in itself but rather on other char-
acteristics of orphan diseases, such as severity and no
alternative treatment, that could just as easily be
applied to common diseases. In addition, they
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analysis is justifiable if the budgetary impact is small,
but also note that while expenditures for individual
orphan drugs may be a small part of the health budget,
collectively they could represent a much larger share.
Ultimatelytheysuggestthatonlyaprovedsocietalpre-
ference for treating rare diseases could justify special
funding status for orphan drugs.
Currently, little evidence exists on preferences for
rarity. A preference for equality in access to treatment
mightbeinferredfrom existinglegislationand govern-
mentdocuments.InNorway,forexample,thecommis-
sion on prioritisation in 1987 stipulated that “health
care should offer everyone the same opportunity to
optimize their health potential,”
8 but this does not spe-
cifically deal with rare conditions and is potentially
inconsistent with language requiring consideration of
costs in the Norwegian Patients’ Rights Act of 1999.
9
Passage of the US Orphan Drug Act, and comparable
regulationsinothercountries,pointstoadesiretoguar-
anteethatrarediseasesarenotneglectedinpharmaceu-
tical research. Recommendations of the Citizen’s
Council of the National Institute for Health and Clini-
cal Excellence in the United Kingdom reflect some
consensus among council members that ultra-orphan
drugs(prevalence<0.18per10000population)becon-
sideredforspecialfundingonthebasisofseverity,pos-
sibilityforimprovementsinhealth,andlifethreatening
disease.
10 There are, however, also reasons to imagine
that a preference for prioritising common diseases
could exist. People might reasonably want society to
devote resources to the treatment of diseases they
believe that they are most likely to experience.
We examined whether a societal preference for rar-
ity, which could justify special funding status for
orphan drugs, exists. The primary hypothesis was
that in the absence of other differences (for example,
disease severity, effectiveness of treatment, or treat-
ment cost), most people will be indifferent to a choice
between treating a rare disease and a common one—
that is, no societal preference for rarity exists. We also
hypothesised that when higher treatment costs for the
rarediseaseareintroduced,peoplewillprioritisetreat-
mentofthecommondisease—thatis,whenconfronted
with limited resources, people will favour using
resources to achieve maximum health gains.
METHODS
In August 2009 TNS Gallup Norway surveyed a ran-
dom sample of 1547 Norwegians aged 40-67, through
the internet. To complete the survey rapidly, Gallup
invited 6000 people from its active panel of 60000 ran-
domly recruited people to participate and closed the
survey after obtaining the researchers’ requested num-
ber of participants. Consequently, the response rate of
26% is biased downwards as not everyone who might
have been willing to participate had the opportunity to
do so. The sample was relatively representative of the
Norwegian population for sex, level of income, and
education and was relatively balanced for
characteristicsoftherespondentsacrossthesixversions
of the survey (table 1).
Survey design
Figure 1 presents the basic structure of the survey (see
web extra for the full text). The survey began with an
introduction to the problem and brief descriptions of a
rare and a common disease, including prevalence,
severity of the disease, and expected benefits of treat-
ment.Thediseasesweredescribedasidenticalwiththe
exceptionofprevalence,with100casesdefinedasrare
and10000ascommoninNorway(population4.8mil-
lion). Respondents were told that extra funds were
available that could be used to treat one of the disease
groups and were presented with two different scenar-
ios: identical treatment costs per patient for each dis-
ease and four times higher costs for the rare disease.
1
For each scenario respondents were asked to decide
whichgrouptoprioritisefortreatment(rare,common,
indifferent) and then to indicate how they would allo-
cate the funds between the disease groups if it were
possibleto do so. The questionon allocation wascom-
pleted by use of an accompanying slide bar marked
with the numbers of patients in each disease group
who would receive treatment under different alloca-
tions of funds. The first scenario was designed to elicit
a preference for rarity in itself; in the absence of any
other differences between the two diseases respon-
dents would be expected to express no preference for
treating patients with the rare disease compared with
treating those with the common disease. The second
scenario, in which the treatment for the rare disease
was more costly, examined preferences for rarity in
the context of a more realistic situation in which the
rare disease was more costly to treat. The survey con-
cluded by asking respondents to rate statements about
equity and efficient use of resources on a five point
Likert scale (1=completely disagree, 5=completely
agree). The final format of the survey included refine-
ments based on a pilot survey of 25 people.
Respondentswere randomised(table 2) toeitherno
informationorcombinationsofinformationondisease
severity (severe v moderate) and expected benefits of
treatment (high v low). Severity and benefits of treat-
ment were presented using the EQ5-D
11 health state
descriptions for mobility and pain. In five versions of
the survey the choices were described in a context of
how to allocate additional funds provided by the gov-
ernment (extra funds scenario), whereas in the sixth
version the choices were framed as whether to treat
patients with rare diseases by reducing the number of
patients currently treated for common diseases (fixed
funds scenario).
RESULTS
General preferences
Rankingsonattitudeto equityusinga fivepointLikert
scale (table 3) indicated strong support for the state-
ments that “all individuals should have equal access
to health care regardless of the cost” (mean score 4.5,
SD 0.98) and “patients with rare diseases should have
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sive” (4.5, 0.86). Respondents also expressed agree-
ment with the potentially contradictory statement,
“health authorities should use resources to provide
the greatest possible health benefits” (3.9, 1.23).
Preferences under trade-off conditions
Thefirstsurveyquestionrequiringa trade-offbetween
different patient groups asked respondents whether
they would use newly available funds to treat 100
patients with a rare disease or 100 patients with a com-
mon disease, a scenario that implies equal treatment
costs for the two diseases. An additional implication
is that the real cost of treating one patient with the
rare disease is the lost opportunity to treat another
patientwiththecommondisease.Fortheentiresample
of 1547 respondents, 173 (11.2%, 95% confidence
interval 9.6% to 12.8%) favoured treating the rare dis-
ease, 369 (23.8%, 21.7% to 26.0%) the common dis-
ease, and 1005 (65.0%, 62.6% to 67.3%) were
indifferent(table 4).Amongthe1289respondentsran-
domisedtosurveyscenarioswithanextrafundsframe,
132 (10.2%, 8.6% to 11.9%) favoured treating the rare
disease, 257 (19.9%, 17.8% to 22.1%) the common dis-
ease, and 900 (69.8%, 67.3% to 72.3%) were indiffer-
ent.Theassociationbetweentheexpressedpreference
and the amount of information provided to respon-
dentsontheseverityofthediseaseandbenefitsoftreat-
ment was significant (χ
2=20.0, P<0.001; table 4,
scenario of no information compared with scenarios
of serious and moderate disease severity with high
and low benefits). Changing the frame from extra
funds to fixed funds (serious disease and high benefits
compared with the same scenario but fixed funds) to
emphasise a potential loss of health benefits to one
group by noting that the 100 patients with rare disease
could be treated only by eliminating treatment for 100
patients currently being treated for common disease,
also had a significant effect on responses (χ
2=70.5,
Table 1 |Respondent characteristics by survey group. Values are percentages unless stated otherwise
Characteristics
Survey version on disease severity and benefits of treatment
Total
(n=1547)
Norwegian population,
target age group*
No information
(n=258)
Serious and
high (n=256)
Serious and
low (n=257)
Moderateand
high (n=258)
Moderateand
low (n=260)
Serious and high,
fixedfunds(n=258)
Men 54.3 55.9 53.3 47.7 54.6 54.3 53.3 50.9
Women 45.7 44.1 46.7 52.3 45.4 45.7 46.8 49.1
Mean age (years) 51 52 53 52 53 52 52 52.7
Marital status:
Married or registered partners 62.7 64.2 60.7 69.0 61.8 68.0 64.4 61.9
Living together 10.0 12.9 14.8 10.7 10.1 12.3 11.8 10.1
Unmarried 13.2 7.9 11.2 6.9 10.7 10.1 10.0 9.3
Separated, divorced, widowed 14.2 15.0 13.3 13.4 17.3 9.7 13.8 18.7
Highest level of education:
<Secondary school/trade school 30.2 28.1 21.2 24.5 26.8 26.8 26.3 22.4
Secondary school 44.8 42.1 50.3 46.4 49.6 47.0 46.7 48.4
University (≤4 years) 15.2 15.5 17.0 17.3 14.4 15.3 15.7 21.3
University (>4 years) 9.8 14.4 11.5 11.8 9.2 11.0 11.3 8.0
Gross personal income (kroner)†:
<200 000 11.8 7.4 11.8 9.9 11.0 10.1 10.3 15.1
200 000 to 399 999 51.2 53.5 53.9 56.8 48.4 51.6 52.5 42.3
400 000 to 599 999 27.2 28.8 24.9 25.9 32.7 28.6 28.1 27.3
600 000 to 799 999 5.3 7.0 7.6 4.9 5.9 6.1 6.2 8.0
≥800 000 4.5 3.3 1.6 2.5 2.0 3.6 2.9 7.4
Kr1 (£0.12; $0.16).
*Data from Statistics Norway, 2008-9.
†Based on 1479 respondents. Sixty eight (4.4%) chose not to reveal personal income.
Survey introduction
Description of rare and common disease
Question 1. Which group would you prioritise? 
  100 patients with rare disease 
  400 patients with common disease
  Indifferent
First scenario:
equal treatment costs for
rare and common diseases
Second scenario:
four times higher treatment
costs for rare disease
Question 2. Use slide bar to indicate how you would divide
funds between patients with rare and common disease
Question 3. Which group would you prioritise? 
  100 patients with rare disease 
  400 patients with common disease
  Indifferent
Question 4. Use slide bar to indicate how you would divide
funds between patients with rare and common disease
Questions 5-9. Statements on Likert scale to assess attitude
Fig 1 | Summary of survey questionnaire
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extra) confirmed these results.
Whetherthepreferenceforraritywassensitivetothe
number of patients with common disease specified in
the trade-off was examined by asking respondents to
imaginethattheextrafundingcouldprovidetreatment
for 100 patients with rare disease or 400 patients with
common disease, implying that the rare disease was
four times more costly to treat than the common dis-
ease (table 5). In this case, 114 (7.4%, 6.1% to 8.7%)
respondents favoured treating the rare disease, a
decline from 11.2% (McNemar test 35.2, P<0.001) in
the equal cost scenario, whereas 701 (45.3%, 42.8% to
47.8%) favoured the common disease and 732 (47.3%,
44.8% to 49.8%) were indifferent.
Figure 2 shows how respondents chose to allocate
resources when offered the opportunity to treat some
patientsfromeachdiseasegroup.Intheequalcostsce-
nario 65.4% (n=1012) favoured dividing the funds
equally, 24.1% (n=373) favoured allocating the larger
share to the common disease, and 10.5% (n=162)
favoured allocating most to the rare disease. These
resultscanalsobeusedtoexaminetheintensityofpre-
ference by assigning a preference weight for each
respondentbasedonthenumberofpatientsinthepre-
ferred treatment group and then summing across peo-
ple. With equal treatment costs, interpretation of the
weighted results is straightforward; a preferred alloca-
tionof40patientswiththerarediseaseand60withthe
commondiseasecarriesaweightof60forthecommon
disease and indicates a preference both for treating 60
patients with the common disease and for spending
60% of resources on treating the common disease.
For the equal cost scenario, the ratio of weighted pre-
ferences for the common to the rare disease was 2.3,
consistent with the unweighted results. In the costly
rare scenario, 42.3% (n=655) of respondents favoured
dividing funds equally, 34.2% (n=529) favoured allo-
cating most to the common disease, and 23.5%
(n=363) favoured allocating most to the rare disease.
Interpreting choices of allocation in this case is more
complicated because dividing the available funds
equally means treating 200 patients with the common
diseaseand50patientswiththerarediseaseratherthan
equal numbers of patients, an outcome that would
occur if 80% of funds were devoted to the rare disease.
Only 3.6% (n=55) of respondents favoured allocating
more than 80% of funds to the rare disease.
DISCUSSION
The results of this cross sectional survey support our
primary hypothesis that, in the absence of other differ-
ences, no societal preference for rarity exists. Faced
with the choice between treating 100 patients with a
rare disease compared with treating 100 patients with
a common disease, most respondents were, as
expected,indifferentregardlessoftheamountofinfor-
mation provided or the framing of the question. A few
prioritised the raredisease but twiceas many favoured
the common disease, a result that is consistent with
prioritising the disease that someone is more likely to
experience. If societal preferences are deemed to be
represented by a simple majority, it is clear that no
societal preference for rarity exists. It is possible that
a societalpreference shouldalso reflectthe intensity of
individual preferences. We considered this possibility
byexaminingweightedpreferenceswhenrespondents
allocated funds to both disease groups, and again we
found no societal preference for rarity.
The results concerning our second hypothesis, that
people will prioritise the common disease if the rare
disease is costlier to treat, are much less convincing.
Whenconfrontedwithascenarioinwhichtheraredis-
ease was four times more costlyto treat, the number of
respondents who expressed a preference for treating
the rare disease declined and many who were pre-
viously indifferent moved to favouring treatment of
the common disease. This provides some support for
the hypothesis. However, a large number of people
(47.3%) expressed indifference when asked to choose
between treating patients with the rare disease and
those with the common disease, and when offered the
Table 3 |Responses of 1547 respondents to three statements assessing attitudes on a five point Likert scale. Values are
percentages (numbers)
Response*
All should have equal access to health
care regardless of costs
Patients with rare diseases should have
samerighttotreatmentasothersevenif
more expensive
Health authorities should use funds
where they provide largest possible
health benefits
1 2.9 (45) 1.6 (25) 6.8 (105)
2 3.8 (59) 2.3 (35) 6.1 (94)
3 6.1 (94) 7.0 (108) 19.0 (294)
4 13.8 (214) 20.8 (321) 27.3 (423)
5 72.7 (1124) 67.4 (1042) 38.9 (601)
Don’t know 0.7 (11) 1.0 (16) 1.9 (30)
*Response on five point Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).
Table 2 |Randomisation of respondents in survey
Scenario (disease severity,
treatment benefit) Funding scenario
No of respondents
(n=1547)
No information Extra funds 258
Severe disease, high benefit Extra funds 256
Severe disease, low benefit Extra funds 257
Moderate disease, high benefit Extra funds 258
Moderate disease, low benefit Extra funds 260
Severe disease, high benefit Fixed funds 258
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between the two disease groups (42.3%).
One possible interpretation of this result is that it
reflects a preference for the rare disease, thus contra-
dictingourhypothesis.Theeconomicinterpretationof
indifferencein thiscaseisthatthe valueoftreatingone
patient with the rare disease is viewed as equivalent to
the value of treating four patients with the common
disease, indicating that treating a patient with the rare
disease is preferred to treating a patient with the com-
mon disease. We are reluctant to accept this inter-
pretation as indication of a societal preference for
rarityforseveralreasons.Firstly,it couldbea manifes-
tation of aversion to choice
12; people are known to
avoid making unpleasant decisions, actively “deciding
not to decide.” Secondly, it might be an indication of a
visual central tendency bias in the results using the
slide bar; picking the middle option is an easy choice
when one is uncertain. Furthermore, given that the
four to one cost differential between orphan and com-
mon treatments implied in the survey is significantly
lower than the cost difference based on actual prices
of orphan drugs,
2 it is likely that support for rarity
would diminish even more in the context of more rea-
listic treatment costs.
A more likely interpretation of the results in the
costlyrarescenarioisthattheyreflecttheconfounding
effect ofa generalconcern forfairness in the allocation
ofhealthresources,asopposedtoaspecificpreference
for prioritising rare diseases over common ones. For
example, two studies
1314 found evidence that people
place greater importance on equity than cost effective-
ness in allocating scarce resources. In practice, unfor-
tunately, it is difficult to disentangle a specific
preference for rarity from a more general preference
for fairness.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Ourstudybenefitsfrombeing,tothebestofourknowl-
edge, the first to examine the issue of preferences for
rarity, and as such provides important information for
policymakersaboutacontroversialtopicthatislikelyto
Table 4 |Preferences of respondents for allocating resources when treatment costs are equal between rare and common
disease, by survey scenario
Scenario
No randomised
to scenario
% (95% CI)
Prioritise rare
disease
Prioritise common
disease Indifferent
All extra funds scenarios 1289 10.2 (8.6 to 11.9) 19.9 (17.8 to 22.1) 69.8 (67.3 to 72.3)
Extra funds (no information) 258 15.9 (11.4 to 20.4) 25.2 (19.9 to 30.5) 58.9 (52.9 to 64.9)
Extra funds (disease severity and
treatment benefit scenarios)
1031 8.8 (7.1 to 10.6) 18.6 (16.2 to 21.0) 72.5 (69.8 to 75.3)
Severe disease, high benefit 256 7.8 (4.5 to 11.1) 15.2 (10.8 to 19.6) 77.0 (71.8 to 82.1)
Severe disease, low benefit 257 9.7 (5.1 to 13.4) 21.0 (16.0 to 26.0) 69.3 (63.6 to 74.9)
Moderate disease, high benefit 258 9.3 (5.7 to 12.9) 16.7 (12.1 to 21.2) 74.0 (68.7 to 79.4)
Moderate disease, low benefit 260 8.5 (5.1 to 11.9) 21.5 (16.4 to 26.5) 70.0 (64.4 to 76.6)
Fixedfunds(severedisease,highbenefit) 258 15.9 (11.4 to 20.4) 43.4 (37.3 to 49.5) 40.7 (34.7 to 46.7)
All scenarios 1547 11.2 (9.6 to 12.8) 23.8 (21.7 to 26.0) 65.0 (62.6 to 67.3)
Table 5 |Respondents’ preferences for allocating resources when treatment costs are four times greater for rare disease
compared with common disease, by survey scenario
Scenario
No randomised to
scenario
% (95% CI)
Prioritise rare
disease
Prioritise common
disease Indifferent
No information 258 13.2 (9.0 to 17.3) 33.7 (27.9 to 39.5) 53.1 (46.0 to 59.2)
Severe disease, high benefit 256 7.0 (3.9 to 10.2) 45.3 (39.2 to 51.4) 47.7 (41.5 to 53.8)
Severe disease, low benefit 257 5.8 (3.0 to 8.7) 42.0 (36.0 to 48.1) 52.1 (46.0 to 58.3)
Moderate disease, high benefit 258 7.4 (4.2 to 10.6) 45.3 (39.2 to 51.4) 47.3 (41.2 to 53.4)
Moderate disease, low benefit 260 6.9 (3.8 to 10.0) 45.0 (38.9 to 51.1) 48.1 (42.0 to 54.2)
Fixedfunds(severedisease,highbenefit) 258 3.9 (1.5 to 6.2) 60.5 (54.5 to 66.4) 35.7 (29.8 to 41.5)
All scenarios 1547 7.4 (6.1 to 8.7) 45.3 (42.8 to47.8) 47.3 (44.8 to 49.8)
Percentage of funding to rare disease
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Fig 2 | Preferences for allocation of resources when faced with
choice to treat some patients with rare disease and some with
common disease
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mary result, that in the absence of other differences
there is no societal preference for rarity, is straightfor-
ward and unambiguous. The survey design expressly
took into account several methodological issues that
could have had an impact on the results: the method
used to elicit preferences may influence responses—
for example, people may express support for general
statements concerning equality of treatment possibili-
tiesbutmaydisplayotherpreferenceswhenconfronted
with situations involving trade-offs; people may be
influenced by framing of the problem—for example,
they may be likely to prefer avoiding loss to experien-
cing an equivalent gain (loss aversion)
15; and the
amount of information provided about the severity of
disease or benefits of treatment may have an impact
(with no information respondents are likely to make
theirownassumptionsabout severityortreatmentben-
efits, clouding the interpretation of their responses).
Our study does, however, have some limitations.
Firstly, and most importantly, it does not provide a
clear sense of the meaning respondents attributed to
the term “indifferent” or to what lay behind the slide
bar decisions in the scenario of treating costly rare dis-
ease, making it difficult to interpret the results in this
case.Lackingthisinformation,thereisnowaytodistin-
guish between a possible specific preference for rarity
and a general preference for fairness when the rare dis-
ease was four times more costly than the common dis-
ease. Secondly, a potential central tendency bias is
inherent in the slide bar method of allocating resources
between the diseases. Thirdly, as with other stated pre-
ference exercises, the hypothetical nature of the ques-
tions may reduce the reliability of the responses.
Fourthly,itispossiblethatourresultsareonlyrepresen-
tativeofNorwegianvaluesandwouldnotreflectprefer-
ences in other countries. Finally, the survey methods
couldhaveresultedinanover-representationofrespon-
dents with strong views, although it is not clear what
effect this would have had on the results. The first four
limitations constitute areas for future research.
Conclusions and policy implications
We see little compelling evidence in our survey results
tosupport the existenceofa societalpreference forrar-
ity in itself, a finding that supports the view that treat-
ments for rare disease should not be exempt from
standard considerations of cost effectiveness. There
may, however, be other unexplored ethical reasons to
favourspecialfundingstatusfororphandrugs;majority
opinion is not necessarily a good measure of what is
ethical. Our findings do suggest that if policy makers
aretotakethedifficultandpossiblyunpopulardecision
to evaluate orphan drugs on the same basis as treat-
ments for common diseases, they need to defend their
choice with clear reference to the opportunity cost (as
measured by numbers of patients with common dis-
eases who will go untreated) of ignoring standard cost
effectiveness criteria.
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WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
Drugs for rare diseases (orphan drugs) seldom meet standard cost effectiveness thresholds
used to evaluate new drugs
Some studies suggest that only a societal preference for rarity would justify granting
exceptions to cost effectiveness thresholds for orphan drugs
To date, no empirical research has been carried out in this area
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
No evidence was found of a societal preference for rarity that would justify ignoring cost
effectiveness considerations
RESEARCH
page 6 of 6 BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com